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Ul THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO. 15567

GEORGE PAPPAS,
Defendant-Apoellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Statement of the Nature of the Case
The Apoellant, George Paooas, apoeals from a judgment
of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the Honorable
Hal C. Taylor, Judge, convicting the ApPellant of the crime of
attempted theft by receiving.
Disposition in the Court Below
The Appellant was charged by information with the
crime of attempted theft by receiving in the District Court of
Salt Lake County.
1977.

Jury trial was held on the 27th day of October,

Appellant was found guilty and uoon judgment, sentenced

to be committed to the Utah State Prison.

Appellant was

released from the Utah State Prison in March, 1978 on bail
Dending the appeal.
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Relief Sought on Appeal
Appellant submits the judgment of the Trial Court
should be reversed, and the charge dismissed, or in the
alternative, a new trial granted.
Statement of Facts
The Appellant was charged by information with the
crime of attempted theft by receiving in violation of 76-6-AOB,
u.C.A., 1953.

~~ich

1976 (R. 6).

It was alleged that the Appellant attempted to

crime allegedly occurred on September 9,

receive firearms which were the property of the Salt Lake City
Police Department (R. 6).

The Salt Lake City Police, through

Officer Vuyk, contacted a prisoner awaiting prosecution who was
detained in the Salt Lake County Jail
induced the prisoner, Rudy

(TR 11-14).

The Police

Sandoval, an admitted burglar

(TR 42), to work undercover for the police.

In exchange, they

would speak to the County Attorney about the charges against
Sandoval

(TR 14).

One charge pending against Sandoval was

dropped, and for his work for the police, Sandoval was oaid
$100.00.

The police arranged for Sandoval's removal from the

.

Salt Lake County Ja1l.

1

They gave him instructions on how to

proceed and furnished him with a rented automobile
The Police purchased a clock-radio from J.
which they also furnished to Sandoval.

c.

(TR 16).

Penny Company

On September 8, 1976,

1
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-3the police "bugged" Mr. Sandoval's person and sent him to the
Appellant's service station.

Sandoval was accompanied by police

who, with their electronic equipment, could overhear what
was said by Sandoval and also hear sounds within his range
(TR 16-17).

At that time Sandoval allegedly told the Appellant,

Pappas, that the property was stolen and that Sandoval was sick
and needed money for drugs.
(TR 19).

A sale of the property was made

The taped portion of that conversation was admitted

as an exhibit (TR 6).
Subsequently, on the 9th of September, 1976, the same
action between the police and Sandoval was repeated.

Firearms

were obtained from the Salt Lake City Police Department,
Training Division.

Sandoval was taped and furnished a vehicle.

He went to Pappas's service station where Sandoval allegedly
sold two guns to Pappas.

According to Sandoval, he told Pappas

that the guns were stolen, that he, Sandoval, was a drug addict,
sick and needed money (TR 38, 39, 42-43).
A search warrant was issued, almost at the same time,
by City Judge, Maurice Jones, who was in a police vehicle

(TR 25), and the radio and guns were seized from the Appellant's
service station.

In addition, Sandoval testified about a prior

sale of property to Pappas some three weeks before.

The testimony

intimated that he had sold property that may have been stolen,
although Sandoval was unclear whether he said it was stolen
(TR 35-36).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the AppellaM
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison.

Argument
POINT I
The Trial Court Erred in Treating the
Issue of EntraPment as Soley an Issue
of Law for the-Court and in not Submitting the Matter of Entrapment to
the Jury for Consideration.
The facts disclose that the Salt Lake City Police
took a prisoner fron the County Jail to act as an undercover
operator, furnished him with guns that the undercover operative
allegedly represented to be stolen, sent the operative to the
Appellant's service station in a rented vehicle, paid the
operative $100.00 for his work, and had the operative sell
the guns to the Appellant.

The operative represented to the

Appellant as a narcontics addict and sick at the time and in
need of money.

Charges against the operative were dropped.

The trial court, at the end of the prosecutor's
case, denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss the charge on
the grounds of entrapment,

(TR 52).

The trial court did not

base the denial on any failure of Appellant to make a written
pre-trial motion (TR 53).

Subsequent to the denial of the

motion, the prosecutor stated,

(TR 54):

MR. NIELSON:
The state would have a
m?tion in the nature of limiting this
t~me, Your Honor, and it would be our
position that inasmuch as the motion for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
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for the defense should be instructed that
no argument is proper with respect to that
particular defense.
THE COURT: Oh, I think that's
correct.
I don't think you can argue a
defense that the court has denied.
and (TR 55):
THE COURT: That's the entrapment as
a matter of law, and had I ruled in your
favor on entrapment, there would have
been no necessary issue to go to the
jury. But because I have ruled against
you, I don't think I am going to
allow you to argue the effect of entrapment.
The trial court and the prosecutor were apparently
under the impression that entrapment, under Utah law, was
purely an issue of law for the court.

This would coincide

with the so called "objective" theory of entrapment.

This is the

position taken by the Model Penal Code, §2.13(2) and in some
states:

State v. Mullen, 216 N.W. 2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v.

Turner, 390 Mich 7, 210 N.W. 2d 336 (1973).

However, the

majority of jurisdictions in the United States apply a "subjective"
or "origin of intent" standard:

Sorrells v. United States,

287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484

(1976).

(1973); Hampton

The position of this

court has been that the proper test to apply is the origin of
intent test, the subjective test, and not the objective standard:
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P2d 494

(1962);

State

v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P2d 1265 (1972); State v. Curtis,
542 P2d 744

(Utah 1975);

State v. Hoffman, 558 P2d 602 (Utah 1976) ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-6under this standard, entrapment is a proper issue for the jury
to consider.

Possibly the trial court was of the mistaken

opinion that the Utah Penal Code adopted the Model Penal
Code position.

However, such is not the case.

76-2-303, U.C.A., 1953 provides for the defense of
entrapment.

The section provides for pre-trial notice of the

defense and a hearing before the judge, and thereafter, consideration is for the jury.

76-2-303(5), U.C.A., 1953 provides:

Should the court determine that the
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss
the case with prejudice, but if the court
determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the
defendant to the jury at trial.
The Utah statute specifies that the entrapment issue
is for the jury if the court determines that entrapment has
not been established as a matter of law:

C.F. State v. Casias,

567 P2d 1097 (Utah 1977); State v. Bridwell, 566 P2d 1232
(Utah 1977).

The issue is not for the court alone unless the

court were to rule entrapment occurred as a matter of law;
State v. Soroushien, 571 P2d 1370 (Utah 1977).

The statute

does not embody the objective standard.
In State v. Sommers, 569 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977),
under similar facts to those now before the court, it was
stated that the entrapment issue was essentially for the
trier of fact.

See also, State v. Basham, 223

s.E.

2d 53

(W.Va. 1976).
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-7Since the trial court was under the mistaken belief
that the entrapment issue was for the court's consideration
alone, the trial court deprived the accused of the right to
have his defense considered by the jury.

This requires reversal

and a new trial.
POINT II
The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial
Error in Admitting Evidence of Other
Criminal Acts of the Appellant.
The trial court admitted into evidence testimony
relating to other criminal acts of the Appellant, other than
that charged in the information.

Appellant was charged with

theft by receiving guns on September 9, 1976, believing that the
guns probably had been stolen.

The trial court received

testimony as to a separate incident on September 8, 1976
involving the receipt by Appellant of a clock-radio.
incident was not charged in the information.

This

In addition,

the testimony of Rudy Sandoval was that about three weeks to
a month before the charged event, Sandoval and a friend, named
Randy Alisando, took a CB radio and home unit to Pappas which
the Appellant bought (TR 35-36).

Sandoval's testimony was

originally that Pappas was advised the items were stolen
(TR 36), but then later retracted from that specific wording,
but certainly left the impression that the item was stolen (TR 36) ·
The last incident was in no way related or connected to the
incident in the information.
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-8counsel for the Appellant, at a pre-trial hearing,
had advised the trial judge the Appellant's defense would be
entrapment (TR 53-54).

Consequently, the only basis for admissio:

of the prior criminal acts would be on the issue of entrapment.
The Appellant did not claim mistake or lack of intent by knowledge
Appellant did not take the stand.

Rule 55, Utah Rules of

Evidence, allows the admission into evidence of other crimes
in a limited number of instances, when material to prove
absence of mistake or accident, intent, knowledge, etc.

The

nature of this case was such that these matters were not material
They were not in issue.
(TR 52).

The only issue was one of entrapment

The exception under Rule 55, U.R.E., was not applicable

Rule 55, U.R.E., otherwise provides:
. . evidence that a person committed
a crime or civil wrong on a specified
occasion, is inadmissable to prove his
disposition to commit crime . . . as the
basis for an inference that he committed
another crime . . . on another specified
occasion . . .
It is submitted, therefore, that the admission of
such evidence was erroneous; State v. Ahrnes, 25 Utah 2d 222,
478 P2d 786

(1971).

Nor can it be validly contended that the evidence
of other crimes was admissable on the issue of entrapment.
Although prior decisions from this court have admitted evidence
of other crimes to rebut claims of entrapment, State v. Perkins,
l9 Utah 2d 421, 432 P2d 50

(1967), such cases have been negated

as precedent by legislative action.

When the Utah Penal Code
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-9was adopted in 1973, 76-2-303(6), U.C.A., 1953, was adopted
which provides:
. . past offenses of the defendant
shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he
may be asked of his past conviction for
felonies . . .
Consequently, where entrapment is in issue, evidence
of other crimes may not be received to rebut an entrapment
claim.

Therefore, there was no legitimate basis to admit

evidence of other crimes, and such evidence was obviously
prejudicial, especially when the trial court took the entrapment issue from the jury.
Although trial defense counsel did not object to the
evidence, the admission was plain error; State v. Poe, 21
Utah 2d 113, 441 P2d 512

(1968).
POINT III

Reversable Error was Committed in
the Prosecution's Opening Argument.
The prosecutor, during his opening argument made
reference to matters outside of the evidence which was to be
presented.

These remarks could only have set the jurors' minds

against the Appellant.

The opening argument of the prosecutor

had the effect of suggesting to the jury that the Appellant
was engaged in a continuing enterprise of dealing in stolen
porperty with theives and burglars.

The prosecutor stated,

and counsel objected:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-10MR. NIELSON: A person who receives
stolen or hot property is sometimes referred to as a fence or a criminal receiver.
Those terms will be referred to probably
with considerable frequency during the
trial today. There is no question in
law enforcement experience that the
activities of thieves and burglars and
so on are supported in large measure by
the stable and continuing market for
stolen property.
MR. BRIDWELL: Your Honor, I again
object to this as properly argument and
not part of an opening statement.
MR. NIELSON: Your Honor, again I
think it's important that this jury undersca~d before we get to the evidence
wha~ k1nd of a crime it is we are talking
about today.
THE COURT: You tell them what the
evidence will show, and I will tell them
what the crime is.
(TR 6).
The statement of counsel was beyond the evidence to be
presented and in the nature of argument.

It characterized the

Appellant as a person engaged in general criminal enterprise.
It included matters not involved in the case.

Later in the

same opening statement, the court was required, again, to
stop counsel, on objection, from speculating about police
procedures in dealing with crimes in theft by receiving

(T!< 7, 8).

The effect of counsel's statement was to obviously
suggest to the jury that Appellant was a professional "fence".
Thus, the Appellant's right to be presumed innocent until the
evidence established his guilt was undermined.

In Wharton's

Criminal Procedure (12th Ed. Torcia) Volume 3 §493,

it observed

as to the prosecutor's opening statement:
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-11Prior to presenting evidence, the
prosecutor may make an opening statement.
In such a statement, the prosecutor
explains the nature of the charge, outlines succintly the supportive evidence
which he expects to prove, and identifies
the issues. Basically, the purpose of the
opening statement is to program the jurors
so that they can follow and understand the
evidence as it unfolds during the trial.
It is not the office of an opening statement to argue the merits of the case, to
discuss the pertinent law, to recite the
anticipated testimony, or other evidence
at length and in detail, to advert to a
confession or other inculpatory statement
of the defendant.
In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 425, 120 P2d 285
(1941) this court stated with reference to opening statements:
The purpose of an opening statement
is to advise the jury of the facts relied
upon and of the questions and issues
involved, which the jury will have to
determine, and to give them a general
picture of the facts and the situations,
so that they will be able to understand
the evidence. Counsel should outline
generally what he intends to prove,
and should be allowed considerable
latitude. He should make a fair statement
of the evidence, and the extent to which
he may go is largely in the discretion of
the trial court.
He should not make a
statement of any facts which he cannot
legally prove upon the trial; nor should
he argue the merits of his case or relate
the testimony at length. See 64 C.J. 235,
Sec. 251; State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 586,
262 P. 113; People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397
164 N.E. 847; Green v. State, 172 Ga.
635 158 S.E. 285.
The District Attorney
went way beyond what was proper, in
reciting verbatim the conversations which
he intended to prove, and in giving the
details of his evidence. The opening
statement should be a brief outline of the
evidence, and not a recital at length of
what he intends to prove.
It was clearly
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-12misconduct on his part, to recite conversations which were hearsay and incompetent
as evidence. And it was improper for him
to overstate the conversations which were
admissable in evidence.
In Erwin, the court held no prejudice resulted because
of the court's instructions.
of presentation of the

In this instant case at the time

prosecution's opening argument, the

court gave no instructions to the jury limiting the effect
of the statement, nor did the court admonish the jury to disregard the improper references.

The opening statement, when

coupled with the evidence of other criminal activities not
charged,

clearl~

preJudiced the Appellant.
POINT IV

The Trial Court Erred in Admitting
Into Evidence Taped Conversations Allegedly
between the State's Undercover Agent and
the Appellant Because:
(1)
The Foundation
for Admission was Insufficient, (2) The
Tape Contained Other Material Not Relevant
to the Case, and (3) No Transcript of the
Tape Was Made for Appellate Review.
The trial judge admitted into evidence, over objection
of Appellant's counsel

(TR 48), tape recorded conversations

between the State's informant and the Appellant.

The tape

recording was played for the jury, and apparently admitted
as an Exhibit,

(Exh. 6).

The tape recording consisted of the

conversation between Appellant, Pappas, and the police operative,
Rudy Dale Sandoval, on September 8 and Se?tember 9, 1976,
involving the sale of a clock-radio on the 8th and guns on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-139th.

Only the incident on the 9th of September, 1976 was

charged.

Counsel for the Appellant objected that there was

no foundation for admission of the tape

(TR 48).

No transcript

of the tape was made at the time the tape was played for the
jury.

In addition to the conversations between Pappas and

Sandoval, the tape contained other wholly extraneous information
(TR 56).

The record is not clear whether the jury had the

tape during their deliberation, although they did not have a
recorder

(TR 56).
The foundation for the admissibility of the tape was

established through the testimony of Officer John Stoner
(TR 45-48).

He testified to placing a body bug on the agent,

"for the purpose of sending him to various areas" to sell
supposedly stolen property (TR 45).

He testified that he

accompanied the other officers to several locations (TR 45).
Stoner accompanied the other officers and the operative in order
to operate the electronic equipment (TR 46).
and taped the conversations.

He listened to

He testified that he subsequently

listened to the tapes and that they accurately reflected
what he heard at the time

(R. 47).

No other foundation was

laid.
Before a tape recording may be received in evidence,
it must be authenticated.

Rule 67, Utah Rules of Evidence,

provides:
Authentication of a writing is required
before it may be received in evidence.
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-14A writing under the Utah Rules of Evidence is defined in Rule
1 (12):
writing means .
. every other means
of recording upon an tangible thing any
form of communication or representation,
including . . . sounds .
Therefore, a tape recording is a writing requiring
authentication.

Rule 67, U.R.E. also provides:

Authentication may be by evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding of its
authenticity or by any other means provided
by law.
Consequently, the Utah Rules of Evidence provide for no specific
and detailed

me~hod

of authentication.

Cases from other

jurisdictions have addressed the standard for authentication
of tape recordings.
In United States v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426
(SDNY 1958), the trial court refused admission of a tape
recording of a conversation offered by the defense.

The

conversation was supposedly with the prosecution's key witness.
The foundation laid for the admissibility of the recording was
similar to that before the trial court in the instant case.
The authenticating witness recognized the defendant's voice
and another person's voice, recalled the conversation, and the
place of the conversation.

Holding the foundation inadequate

for admission, the court laid seven criteria for admission:
A review of the authorities leads to
the conclusion that, before a sound recording
is admitted into evidence, a foundation
must be established by showing the following
facts:
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-151.
That the operator of the device
was capable of taking the conversation
now offered in evidence.
2.
That the operator of the device
was competent to operate the device.
3.
That the recording is authentic
and correct.
4.
That changes, additions, or
deletions have not been made in the
recording.
5. That the recording has been
preserved in a manner that is shown to the
court.
6.
That the speakers are identified.
7.
That the conversation elicited
was made voluntarily and in good faith,
without any kind of inducement.
An examination of the foundation testimony given in
the instant case shows a critical failure to meet the foundation
requirements for admission.

Especially critical is the failure

to identify the speakers as was requested by defense counsel.
No foundation on voluntariness was laid.

The absence of

additions and deletions was not accounted for.

Indeed, the

tape contains other conversations than those relevant to the
instant case.

No foundation as to the accuracy of the recording

device or its operation was before the court.
Identification of the alleged speakers is critical
to the authentication of taped evidence of an undercover
police operation.
operative

Especially this is so when a criminal

is being used who has a great deal to gain from

getting what the police and the operative may hope for and
where others may be present.
231 F2d 887

In United States v. Sansone,

(2nd Cr. 1956), the court observed:
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-16When a portable transmitting and
receiving set, or other device is used to
overhear conversations, the initial
qualification for admission of evidence
involves two sets of interelated problems:
First, whether the device used is an
effective means of communicating sound,
and Second, the identification of the
alleged speaker. P. 890.
Neither foundational prerequisite was adequately
established in this case.

In Sansone, the court went on to

observe concerning the foundations for bugging devices:
Such evidence, however, should be
treated with considerably greater caution
than evidence arising from telephone
conversations, due to much greater familiarity
of the general public with the characteristics and potentialities of the telephone.
In annotation, Admissibility of Sound Recordings
in Evidence, 58 ALR2d 1024, 32, it is observed:
. and generally it may be said,
the cases indicate a strict adherence to
the rules for testing the admissibility
of recordings.
It is, therefore, submitted that reversable error
was committed in receiving the tape recording

(Exh. 6) without

proper foundation.
Second, it is submitted this court should revers0
because no transcript of the recording was made and other
matter was on the tape.
423 Cal.

Recently, in Peoole v. Caston, 573 P2d

(1978), the California Supreme Court had a similar

issue before it.

The court noted Appellant's counsel had

stipulated a stenographic record of the transcription did not
have to be made, a situation unlike that in the instant case.
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-17It is also noted that a tape recording during the trial was
part of the oral proceedings and should be included as part
of the normal record.

It is submitted that the failure of the

trial court to cause a transcript of the tape to be made is
an additional reason for reversal.
POINT V
The Trial court Improperly Instructed
The Jury on the Elements of the Charge
Against the Appellant.
The information in the instant case charged the
Appellant with attempted theft by receiving (R.6).

The

specific allegation against the Appellant was an attempt to
"receive stolen property, to wit: firearms . .

The sale

conduct alleged against the Appellant was the act of receiving.
76-6-408(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 defines "receives"
as "acquiring possession, control, or title, or lending on the
security of property."

76-6-408(1), Utah Code Annotated provides

several methods of violation of that section of the code.
The offense may be committed by:
(c) disposing,

(d) concealing,

(a) receiving,

(b) retaining,

(e) selling, or (f) witholding.

The Appellant was charged only with receiving.

None of the

other possible violations of 76-6-408(1) U.C.A. 1953 were
alleged.
Instruction number ll given by the court advised the
jury that the Defendant could be convicted if he "received or
retained"
property believing it to be stolen (TR 40). A
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-18similar instruction was given in instruction 12

(TR 41).

Thus, the instructions given by the court allowed the jury to
find the Appellant guilty on a definition of the crime not
charged in the information.

The instructions went beyond the

offense charged and encompassed conduct of a different nature
than that alleged.
In State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P2d 153
(1946), this court states:
We have repeatedly criticized the
giving of abstract statements of the law
to the jury, and heed that it is the duty
of the court to apply the law to the facts
supported by the evidence and to not
instruct on any question which is not
involved in the case under the evidence
(citing numerous Utah cases).
. . . l~e think that it cannot be too
strongly emphasized that the court should
apply the law to the facts as they appear
from the evidence, and should instruct
only on the law which has a bearing on
facts . . . (110 Utah 101)
In State v. Anselmo, 558 P2d 1325, 1327

(Utah 1977),

this court observed:
Ordinarily it is error to instruct
on abstract principles of law that are
not applicable to the facts before the
jury .
In the instant case, the instructions exceeded the
charge and the evidence.

If accepted by the jury, the

instructions given could have authorized the jury to find the
Appellant guilty on a charge different than that contained
in the information.

The evidence and the prosecution's theory

of the case was based on attempted receipt of property believed
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-19to have been stolen.

The question of retaining property was not

before the trial court.

However, the jury could have believed

that the defendant's guilt was made out if he retained rather
than received the property, believing it to have been stolen.
Thus, the instructions given were confusing, misleading, and
erroneous.

Prejudicial error was committed.
POINT VI
Title 76, Chapter 6, Setion 408,
U.C.A., 1953, as Interpreted and Applied
In this Case Violates Article 1, §7 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and
the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.
In State V. Sommers, 539 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977), this

court ruled that a conviction for attempted theft by receiving
can be sustained by the receipt of property by a defendant
believing the property to have been stolen when in fact the
property was not stolen.

This court sustained the constitution

ality of section 76-4-101(3) (6), U.C.A., 1953 eliminating the
defense of legal or factual impossibility.

Thus, the construction

the court left as to 76-6-408, U.C.A., 1953 on theft by receiving
was that the mere receipt of property by a person believing the
property probably to be stolen would suffice to convict.

The

Appellant submits that this construction of 76-6-408, U.C.A.,
1953 violates the "due process" clause of Article 1 §7 of the
Constitution of Utah, especially as applied in this case.
This issue was not passed on in Sommers.
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-20The Appellant, Pappas, received property that had
never been the subject of theft or wrongful appropriation.
No person suffered any loss, nor was the public health, safety,
and welfare threatened by Pappas act.

If any injury occurred to

the public fisk, it was from the use of public funds to buy
an uneeded clock-radio, rent an automobile for two days, and
pay a burglar who was released from jail on two occassions,
apparently without approval of the committing judicial official.
The property involved, which was allegedly stolen, but not in ht
was tendered to the Appellant by a police agent with full
and allowance by police officers.

urgi~

To allow Pappas to be convictt

and sentenced to prison under such circumstances denies due
process of law.

The statute as construed and applied allowed

Pappas to be committed for an act not itself injurious in any
fashion.

The evidence, if any, is simply Pappas's thinking the

property was stolen because the police deliberately lied to
him.

Consequently it is submitted that the statute as applied

in this case is unconstitutional.

The State's legislative

power must be exercised to promote health, comfort, safety,
good morals, and general welfare.

State ex. rel. Cox v. Board

of Education, 21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (1900).

The mere

legislative declaration that an act is within its police power
does not, in fact, make it so.
Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P2d 229

Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v.
(1933).

Recently in Peck v.

Dunn, 574 P2d 367 (Utah 1978), this court observed as to the
legislative authority:
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-21It is elementary that the governing
authority in the exercise of its police
power has both the perrogative and the
responsibility of enacting laws which will
promote and conserve the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of society.
Within this standard, it is well settled that the
criminal law may not be used to punish thinking about crime;
Burdick. Law of Crime, Vol I §98; Rex v. Sutton, 1 East,
Pleas of the Crown 172, 93 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1736):

"It is

certain that a bare intention is not punishable .
Republican v. Malin, 1 Dall.

(U.S.) 33, 11th Ed. 25.

In Holmes, The Common Law, p. 67, it was stated:
The reason for punishing any act
must generally be to prevent some harm
which is foreseen as likely to follow that
act under the circumstances in which it
is done.
In most substantive crimes, the
ground on which that likelihood stands is
the common working of natural causes as
shown by experience.
But when an act is
punished the natural effect of which is
not harmful under the circumstances, that
ground alone will not suffice.
Therefore, the criminal law may not be used to punish
evil thoughts without some act of significance to the health,
safety, morals, and welfare.
In People v. Johnson, 564, P2d 116 (Colo. 1977),
the Colorado Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of the Colorado receiving statute which was similar to the
Utah statute as construed.

The court held that the statute

was unconstitutional on grounds other than now being discussed,
but observed:
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-22We do not have a situation in which
the property was not in fact stolen.
Therefore, we do not reach the question
of constitutionality of a conviction of a
defendant who believes unstolen property
was stolen.
Here the issue is presented.

It is submitted that

under facts of this case, no harm to the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizenry being shown, the conviction cannot
stand in the face of Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution.
Federal cases have also recognized the constitutional
limitations on prosecution for mere intent with in innocuous
act.

The United States Supreme Court has narrowly construed

Congressional efforts to regulate conduct that may involve
criminal regulation of a state of mind.
354 U.S. 298

Yates v. United States,

(1957); Seales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203

(1960); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444

(1969).

There are

limitations imposed by the due process clause of the XIVth
Amendment on the exercise of legislative authority.
Bd. of Education v. La Fluer, 414 U.S. 632

(1974).

Cleveland
Thus,

a California ordinance that made it criminal for a felon to
be in a city without registering was ruled in violation of the
XIVth

Amendment.

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225

see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
constitutional

to punish being addicted.

(1957);

(1962), un-

Under a similar

consideration of the limitations on the legislative authority,
76-6-408' U .C .A., 1953, as construed and applied is unconstitutior:
In addition, Appellant contends 76-6-408, 1953 is
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-23-

process by making criminal a state of mind that merely requires
"believing that (property) probably has been stolen".
v. Mullins, 549 P2d 454

In State

(Utah 1976), this court upheld, in the

face of a constitution challenge, the presumption relating
to knowledge of stolen property contained in 76-6-408(1)
U.C.A., 1953.

In State v. Plum, 552 P2d 124 (Utah 1976), this

court held the mental state required in the state was not
unconstitutional because of vagueness.

However, neither of the

two cases cited considered whether the statute violated due
process by being overly broad in scope.
In People v. Johnson, 564 P2d 116 (Colo. 1977), the
Colorado Supreme Court considered a challenge to similar but
less specific language in the Colorado Statute dealing with the
mental responsibility for theft by receiving--"reasonable cause
to believe.

The Colorado Supreme Court held the statute

unconstitutional.

The court stated:

We hold that that portion of the
statute defining the mental state as
including "having reasonable cause to
believe" is unconstitutional by reason
of overbreadth.
In order for a statute
such as this to be constitutional, there
must be a knowledge or belief by the
defendant that the goods were stolen.
There is a constitutional proscription
against conviction of a defendant charged
with felony by theft if it is predicated
upon his negligence or his failure to
exercise the intelligence of an ordinary,
prudent man.
The standard of culpability,
in order to be constitutional, must be
what the state of mind of the particular
defendant was, not what a jury concludes
might be that of a fictional reasonably
prudent
man.
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-24This court should reverse and dismiss because
76-6-408, U.C.A., 1953 violates Article I §7 of the Constitution
of Utah and the XIVth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant respectfully submits this court should
reverse.

The trial court's failure to submit the issue of

entrapment to the jury was based on an erroneous conclusion as
to the defense of entrapment under Utah law.

The court also

erred in receiving evidence of other criminal acts or wrongs
of the Appellant, Pappas.

Prejudicial error was committed

in the prosecutor's opening statement.

In addition, the court

improperly admitted critical evidence without proper foundation
and under circumstances that prevented its fair consideration
at trial or on appeal.

The instructions given by the court

also constituted prejudicial error.

Finally, the statute

under which the Appellant was convicted as interpreted and applied
in this case, is unconstitutional.

This case should be

reversed and dismissed.

Respectfully submitted

I

DEAN R. MITCHELL
AUorney for Defendant-Appell'"ll
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